An Observation Concerning Porte’s Rule in Modal Logic

It is well known that no consistent normal modal logic contains (as theorems) both ◊A and ◊¬A (for any formula A). Here we observe that this claim can be strengthened to the following: for any formula A, either no consistent normal modal logic contains ◊A, or else no consistent normal modal logic contains ◊¬A

Modal Formulas True at Some Point in Every Model

In a paper on the logical work of the Jains, Graham Priest considers a consequence relation, semantically characterized, which has a natural analogue in modal logic. Here we give a syntactic/axiomatic description of the modal formulas which are consequences of the empty set by this relation, which is to say: those formulas which are, for every model, true at some point in that model

Supervenience, Dependence, Disjunction

This paper explores variations on and connections between the topics mentioned in its title, using as something of an anchor the discussion in Valentin Goranko and Antti Kuusisto’s “Logics for propositional determinacy and independence”, a venture into what the authors call the logic of determinacy, which they contrast with (a demodalized version of) Jouko Väänänen’s modal dependence logic. As they make clear in their discussion, these logics are closely connected with the topics of noncontingency and supervenience. Two opening sections of the present paper address some of these connections, including related earlier logical work by the present author as well as very recent work by Jie Fan. The Väänänen-inspired treatment is presented in a third section, and then, in Sections 4 and 5, as a kind of centerpiece for the discussion, we follow Goranko and Kuusisto in elaborating one principal reason offered for preferring their own approach over that treatment, which concerns some anomalies over the behaviour of disjunction in the latter treatment. Sections 6 and 7 look at dependence and (several different versions of) disjunction in inquisitive logic, especially as presented by Ivano Ciardelli. Section 8 revisits the less formal property-supervenience literature with issues from the first two sections of the paper in mind, and we conclude with a Postscript addressing a further conceptual issue pertaining to the relation between modal and quantificational dependence logics

Partial Confirmation of a Conjecture on the Boxdot Translation in Modal Logic

The purpose of the present note is to advertise an interesting conjecture concerning a well-known translation in modal logic, by confirming a (highly restricted) special case of the conjecture

Modal Formulas True at Some Point in Every Model

In a paper on the logical work of the Jains, Graham Priest considers a consequence relation, semantically characterized, which has a natural analogue in modal logic. Here we give a syntactic/axiomatic description of the modal formulas which are consequences of the empty set by this relation, which is to say: those formulas which are, for every model, true at some point in that model

Power Matrices and Dunn--Belnap Semantics: Reflections on a Remark of Graham Priest

The plurivalent logics considered in Graham Priest's recent paper of that name can be thought of as logics determined by matrices (in the `logical matrix' sense) whose underlying algebras are power algebras (a.k.a. complex algebras, or `globals'), where the power algebra of a given algebra has as elements \textit{subsets} of the universe of the given algebra, and the power matrix of a given matrix has has the power algebra of the latter's algebra as its underlying algebra, with its designated elements being selected in a natural way on the basis of those of the given matrix. The present discussion stresses the continuity of Priest's work on the question of which matrices determine consequence relations (for propositional logics) which remain unaffected on passage to the consequence relation determined by the power matrix of the given matrix with the corresponding (long-settled) question in equational logic as to which identities holding in an algebra continue to hold in its power algebra. Both questions are sensitive to a decision as to whether or not to include the empty set as an element of the power algebra, and our main focus will be on the contrast, when it is included, between the power matrix semantics (derived from the two-element Boolean matrix) and the four-valued Dunn--Belnap semantics for first-degree entailment a la Anderson and Belnap) in terms of sets of classical values (subsets of {T, F}, that is), in which the empty set figures in a somewhat different way, as Priest had remarked his 1984 study, `Hyper-contradictions', in which what we are calling the power matrix construction first appeared

Partial Confirmation of a Conjecture on the Boxdot Translation in Modal Logic

The purpose of the present note is to advertise an interesting conjecture concerning a well-known translation in modal logic, by confirming a (highly restricted) special case of the conjecture

What is a Paraconsistent Logic?

Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively

Negation and the functional sequence

There exists a general restriction on admissible functional sequences which prevents adjacent identical heads. We investigate a particular instantiation of this restriction in the domain of negation. Empirically, it manifests itself as a restriction the stacking of multiple negative morphemes. We propose a principled account of this restriction in terms of the general ban on immediately consecutive identical heads in the functional sequence on the one hand, and the presence of a Neg feature inside negative morphemes on the other hand. The account predicts that the stacking of multiple negative morphemes should be possible provided they are separated by intervening levels of structure. We show that this prediction is borne out